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fundamental principles of democratic government. Insofar, however, as the
derogation of the rights of citizens is permitted to become a tool for the
oppression of minorities and the suppression of the "hostile" opposition, the
changing standards would seem to be in retreat from the principles of
democracy. The very institution of enemy hearing boards, which now seems
an advance from the old concept of the rightless enemy alien, can become
a star chamber for the coercion of recalcitrant citizens in the hands of an
administration that is not alive to the responsibility of a fair and objective
application of restrictions.
The successful application of criteria based on loyalty rather than citizen-
ship would seem to demand a considerable degree of realism in viewing the
world and the war. If hostility is to be determined on an individual basis,
the determinors must act on the basis of a clear vision of the difference
between disloyalty to the nation and disaffection for the incumbent admin-
istration, and must see the war in terms of an instrument of national, rather
than partisan, policy. There is no place in such a scheme for legal fictions.
The heart of the change is the discarding of the old fiction that any national
of the enemy government is per se loyal to the enemy, while any citizen of
the home government is per se loyal to the home government. In place of
this fictional concept is the realization that-loyalty is a matter of individual
men, to be individually determined. If it is to be so determined, the deter-
mination must be done afresh in each case, and not from a predetermination
that all members of a given racial or cultural group are a priori disloyal.
PUBLIC CONTROL OF PETROLEUM PIPE LINES
THE strategic position of pipe lines' in the petroleum industry derives partly
from the importance of transportation in an industry with widely separated
producing, refining, and consuming areas.2 Thus, California, Texas, and the
major producing states in the great Mid-Continent field-Oklahoma, Arkansas,
and Louisiana - supplied 73% of the crude recovered in the United States
1. As used in this article, "pipe lines" refers to "trunk pipe lines," or those which
run from field to refinery, or from refinery to market area. "Gathering pipe lines" run
from wells to entering terminals on the "trunk lines," and the relatively minor problems
connected with their operation will not be discussed in this article.
2. The three states of Texas, California and Oklahoma together produced 77% of
the total crude oil of the United States in 1937, but consumed only 16% of the gasoline.
On the other hand, all states east of Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Georgia produced
3% of the total crude oil in 1937, but consumed 40% of the gasoline. See Hearbigs be-
fore the Temporary National Economic Committee Pursuant to Public Resolution No.
113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939) Chart V facing page 7704 (hereafter cited as TNEC
Hearings).
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in 1941.3 Some of the most important markets, on the other hand, are
represented by the large metropolitan areas in the north central states and
along the Atlantic seaboard. Since some refineries are located in the fields,
gasoline pipe lines compete with tank car and truck in taking gas from
them to consuming areas. Crude oil pipe lines take oil to another group
of refineries located on the Gulf Coast, and the refined gasoline goes in large
part by tanker to markets on the Atlantic seaboard. The greatest number
of refiners, however, are located in the market areas. They may receive
crude by oil pipe lines,4 or in the case of refineries located on the East Coast,
by a combination of crude oil pipe line from the fields to the Gulf and tanker
shipments of crude to the refineries.
The importance of petroleum pipe lines which is derived from the geo-
graphical arrangement of the industry is enhanced by the fact that for certain
areas pipe lines possess major advantages over the other chief means of trans-
portation - tanker and tank car. The cheapest form of transportation is
the tanker; but it cannot be used for many important market regions. Trans-
portation by tank car is much more expensive than by pipe line.5 The
importance of the oil pipe line in the industry can best le demonstrated by
the fact that, during each of the years from 1934 to 1937, 71%1 of the crude
oil received at refineries was delivered by pipe line." While the gasoline pipe
line does not play as large a role, relatively, as the crude oil pipe line, its
importance is steadily increasing.7
Possession of ready access to pipe lines by some companies has necessarily
given them a distinct competitive advantage over other firms unable to use
the lines on equal terms. The result has been to limit competition in the
crude market and in the refinery and wholesale gasoline markets. Concerns
in a position to use crude oil lines are enabled to locate their refin-
eries 8 in the market areas. This arrangement allows more flexible operation
since the refiner can shift his purchases of crude as circumstances of supply and
price change in the different fields. Less fortunate refiners must usually locate
in the fields for two reasons. In the first place pipe line rates and restrictive
shipping conditions are such as to force the independent oil producer to sell his
3. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Monthly Petroleum Statement. No.
P219, Dec., 1941. The fields in Illinois, another major producing state, are located near
the great Chicago market area.
4. As used in this article, "oil pipe lines" refer to lines used for transporting crude
petroleum, while "gasoline pipe lines" refer to lines used for transporting gasoline and
other petroleum products.
5. Relative costs are tanker, 1.25 mills per ton-mile, pipe line, 32 mills per ton-
mile, and tank car, 8.3 mills per ton-mile. See CooK, TNEC REP., Co:,TaRL OF THE PZ-
TROLEUM1 INDUSTRY BY MAJOR OIL COmSPAIES, Monograph 39 (1941) p. 19.
6. See TNEC Hearings at 7719.
7. See id. at 7724, 7728.
S. In most cases, it is the refiner, and not the producer, jobber, or retailer, who
ships over the oil pipe line. Oil is customarily bought at the well by the refiner, and he
pays for its transportation to his plant.
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crude in the field rather than ship it to market areas. And unless there is an
independent refiner located in the field, the sale of crude must usually be to the
major owning the pipe line running from the field.0 In the second place the
refiner is unable to make extensive use of tank car and truck in getting
crude from the field to a market-located refinery since they are too
costly for the purpose, and tankers, on the other hand, are usually tnavail-
able. Even when tankers are available, the small refiner may find it impossible
to use them because of the high costs of storing and shipping the large
amount required as a minimum shipment by the tanker owners.10 The refiner
located in the field is necessarily tied to the conditions of crude supply and
price prevailing in his field. When the field is exhausted, the refiner must
go out of business or move; and as new, flush fields, capable of producing
a lower-cost crude, are discovered, the field located refiner is necessarily left
at a competitive disadvantage as far as the larger markets are concerned.
In like manner, access to gasoline pipe lines is of great advantage in allowing
the refiner to extend his market beyond the restricted area about the refinery
which he can reach by truck or short rail shipments. Gasoline lines are
especially important to field-located refineries, most of which lie far from
the major market areas.
Control of oil and gasoline pipe lines is in the hands of the twenty major
oil companies. Each of these so-called "majors" is an integrated company,
engaging in all phases of the oil industry, production of crude, refining,
transportation and marketing. 1 The twenty majors produce 52% of the
crude oil; they own 87% of the deadweight tonnage of tankers, and they
sell 80% of the gasoline.' 2 The extent of major company control over pipe
lines is demonstrated by these facts: On January 1, 1938, fourteen of these
twenty major companies owned 89% of all crude oil pipe line mileage on
which reports to the Interstate Commerce Commission are given. 13 On the
same date, these same fourteen companies owned 96% of the total gasoline
pipe line mileage in the United States.14
The majors have used their ownership and control of the pipe lines to
prevent the independent refiners from using the lines on equal terms. As
evidence that the independents have made little or no use of the lines, the
Interstate Commerce Commission found that, in a group of thirty-seven im-
portant oil pipe line companies, ten served none but their oil company owners,
twenty served from one to six non-owner shippers, while seven served from ten
9. The price of crude is posted by one of the major oil companies in each of the
large oil fields and the posted price is usually followed by the other oil companies. See
THEC Hearings at 9767, 9943-9945 and Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 608, 621.
10. See CooK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 19.
11. Total assets of these companies amount to nearly nine billion dollars, or sixty
percent of the total investment in the entire industry. See CooK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 3.
12. See id. at 5.
13. The Commission receives reports on approximately 89% of the total crude oil
trunk pipe line mileage in the United States. See TNEC Hearings at 7720, 7723.
14. See id. at 7729.
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to thirty-seven non-affiliated shippers.Y And, as the Commission pointed out,
the non-owner shippers, reported by twenty-seven out of the thirty-seven firms,
were in most, if not all, cases other majors."; Perhaps the best evidence that
the independent refiners are not using the pipe lines is the fact that the great
majority of them are located in the mid-continent oil fields. This was caused
largely by the fact that independent refiners could not get access to the oil
pipe lines, and, therefore could not locate in the market areas.' 7
The majors have used their pipe lines to obtain oil in the field at favorable
prices and gain a competitive advantage over independent refiners in the
market areas, despite the nominal common carrier status of the lines, which
should guarantee equality of treatment to all shippers. The techniques by
which the majors have accomplished this are, broadly speaking, twofold. The
rates charged have usually been greatly in excess of cost of service; and
onerous service regulations, centering chiefly around high minimum tender
requirements, have been imposed.
Although the majors likewise pay the high rates, they receive back the excess
of charges over cost in the form of dividends or profits on their pipe line
departments. For them the high rates are wholly a matter of bookkeeping.
In addition, they receive the profits made by the pipe line companies on any
shipments of oil made by the independents. Thus the majors receive a
double rebate.
That pipe line rates are much higher than pipe line costs, including what-
ever might be regarded as a reasonable return on investment, has been
demonstrated many times. Testimony before the Temporary National
Economic Committee disclosed that, on one oil pipe line, the rate was
20 cents per barrel, while the cost, including 6% on the investment, was
but 10 cents per barrel.' 8 On another oil line, the rate was 17X cents per
barrel, while the cost was but 5 cents per barrel.' The Interstate Commerce
Commission found that, in 1935, 27 of the most important oil pipe line com-
panies averaged a return of 17% on the final valuations of their property
made by the Interstate Commerce Commission.20 The Commission said that,
"It is evident that the rates charged by the respondents are not made with
any relation to the cost of service ... "21 A comparison of rates with
costs, including 6% on investment, of a gasoline pipe line running from Tulsa
to various cities disclosed the following:22
15. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 121 (1940).
16. See id. at 139.
17. See TNEC Hearings at 8157-8158.
18. See id. at 7338.
19. See id. at 7582.
20. Figures taken from Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 1. C. C.
115, 148 (1940).
21. See id. at 139.
22. Figures taken from Petroleum Rail Shippers' Association v. Alton & Southern
Railroad, 243 L C. C. 589, 616 (1941). In this proceeding, the rates quoted above were
drastically reduced. See page 1353 infra.
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Cost (in cents per
Rate (in cents 100 lbs. and including
City per 100 lbs.) 6% on investment)
Kansas City, Missouri 28 7
Des Moines, Iowa 36 13
Chicago, Illinois 40 19
Madison, Wisconsin 46 19
Duluth, Minnesota 52 24
Marquette, Michigan 63 27
Statistics compiled by the staff of the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee for the year 1938 disclosed that 15 principal pipe line companies
owning 77% of the net investment in carrier property of all oil and gasoline
pipe lines reporting to the Interstate Commerce Commission had an average
rate of return of 28% on investment less depreciation.23 All these figures
point to the conclusion that pipe line rates are excessively high, when coin-
pared with pipe line costs, including a reasonable return on investment.
During the last few years there have been substantial rate reductions on
many pipe lines.24 However, it is probable that rates are still much higher
than costs on many lines, especially in view of the increase in receipts and
revenues of some lines owing to the critical shortage of tankers.20
It is, however, argued that the hazards of pipe line ownership justify the
high rates of return. A high rate of profit has been defended on the ground
that it is impossible to calculate the length of life of an oil field upon which a
pipe line depends and that there always exists the possibility that the discovery
of better pools may suddenly divert the demand for oil to new areas. Also,
that as the pool runs out and the volume of crude declines, per barrel costs
will increase.26 To compensate for this, there is need for a high rate of return
in the early years of operation of a pipe line. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that pipe lines might be used for transporting alcohol made from
vegetable matter, or liquefied or powdered coal, when they can no longer
be used to transport oil or gasoline.27 However, in most instances, this whole
23. Those companies which report to the Commission own 85-90% of the total in-
vestment in pipe lines. See TNEC Hearings at 7720.
24. See page 1353 infra.
25. It is not clear from the statements accompanying these statistics on pipe line
costs just how overhead costs were handled and how the per-barrel costs varied with dif-
ferent rates of operation. In Reduced Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115
(1940) the Interstate Commerce Commission did record some evidence indicating that
overhead costs did not play the dominant role in the make-up of per-barrel costs. Thus
while volume of oil transported doubled for one pipe line its unit costs decreased but
11.3%; with another, while volume increased 66.5%, unit cost remained almost the same.
Id. at 128. However, the figures covered a range of several years during which costs of
various items such as labor greatly increased. It is probable that now with many pipe
lines operating at full capacity, per-barrel costs are at a minimum and the disparity be-
tween income and cost per barrel is even greater than that shown for peacetime opera-
tions.
26. See BEARD, REGULATION OF PIPE LINES AS COMMON CARRIERS (1941) 80.
27. See id. at 170.
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argument is rather unrealistic since many of the pipe line investments have long
since been returned to the stockholders as dividends.2 8 The Interstate Com-
merce Commission emphasized this fact in Reduced Pipe Line Rates and
Gatkering Charges29 where the Commission issued an order to a large group of
important oil pipe line companies to show cause why their rates should not lie
reduced so as to yield only 8% on the valuation of their property.
A second reason why independent refiners find it very difficult to utilize
pipe lines lies in certain service regulations imposed by pipe line companies.
Chief among these service regulations is that of high minimum tender require-
ments. A minimum tender is a minimum amount which a pipe line will
accept for shipment over its lines. Although minimum tender requirements
differ greatly with different pipe lines, a typical figure is 50,000 barrels.?
Such a large minimum tender makes it difficult, if not impossible, for a small,
independent refiner to use the pipe lines.3' An independent refiner may
have refinining capacity of only 2,50 barrels per day. To use the pipe line
which has a minimum tender requirement of 50,000 barrels, he must order
enough oil shipped to him to last 20 days. The investment in oil alone,
at current prices,3 2 is $55,500. In addition, the transport charge from, say
the Mid-Continent area to Chicago, is over $10,000. Finally, the refiner must
28. Thus in Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges there was evidence
showing that two pipelines running from the Mid-Continent field to Illinois were oper-
ating at only 25% of capacity and losing money due to competition from the new" Illinmis
fields. However, the Commission pointed out that both lines had "returned in dividends
to their owners much more than the amount of money invested" in ther". Reduced Pipe
Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 133 (1940).
29. 243 I. C. C. 115, 132, 133 (1940). And in many cases of pipe line companies
which had returned in dividends such a large proportion of their original investment,
accrued depreciation charges represented likewise a large fraction of the original invest-
ment. The following table shows "for typical pipe lines owned by large oil companies
through stock ownership and for one independent company" investment, accrued depre-
ciation, and "the total dividends paid by each respondent named during the period Jan-
uary 1, 1929, to June 30, 1938.'
Accrued
Company Investment Depredation Dizidcnds
Atlantic Pipe Line Co ........ $19,300.000 $12,q00,000 130,900,000
Buckeye Pipe Line Co ........ 19,900,000 12,700,000 6,900,000
Humble Pipe Line Co ........ 101,300,000 46,400,000 138,200,000
Illinois Pipe Line Co ........ 38,700,000 26,000,000 38,600,0u0
Shell Pipe Line Corp ........ 55,800,000 27,600,000 101,400,000
Stanolind Pipe Line Co .... 90,800,00U 54,200,000 111,C00,00
(Figures are to the nearest $100,000. Id. at 130, 131. The ICC, of course, controls
depreciation charges for the common carrier pipe lines.
30. See CooK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 24, and TNEC, REV. REVIEw AND CrI TcIs!x
ox BEEHALF OF STAND.RD OIL Co. (NEw JESEY) AND SrN OIL Co. OF M.O:;. apn
No. 39 wrr REJOINDER BY MONOGRAPH AUTHOR, Monograph 39-A (1941) page 87.
31. See BEARD, op. cit. supra note 26, at 95; TNEC Hcarings at 8209-43U0; Petro-
leum Rail Shippers' Association v. Alton & Southern Railroad, 243 I. C. C. 589, (57
(1941).
32. See New York Times, May 24, 1942, p. 5, col. 1.
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build expensive storage tanks at his refinery, and in the oil field, and run
the risk of evaporation, fire, and falling prices. Thus, the expense is pro-
hibitive to all but the large, major company refineries. The same analysis
is applicable to the small refiner who desires to use a gasoline pipe line.
The evidence as to the necessity of high minimum tenders is conflicting.
Various shipments of oil may differ in quality, and if one kind of oil follows
another kind through the pipe line, the two may mingle, and thus cause
contamination. The same is true of gasoline. The contention is that the
commingling is increased if smaller shipments are conveyed, and that the
cost of putting a shipment of oil or gasoline back on specification after it
has thus become contaminated justifies high minimum tender requirements.
The problem of contamination may, however, have received exaggerated
emphasis, since there are means at hand to decrease the amount of con-
tamination.33 The defenders of high minimum tenders also argue that there
are other expenses which arise from low minimum shipments.84 While it
is difficult to arrive at a conclusion on a problem so largely technological
in character, it would seem that a minimum tender requirement of 50,000
barrels is unnecessarily high. The Interstate Commerce Commission, al-
though not completely convinced, felt that a minimum tender of more than
10,000 barrels was unreasonable on oil pipe lines.35
Other service regulations may hamper use of pipe lines by independents.
For example, the problem of ratable takings may arise. If the total amount
of oil or gasoline sought to be shipped exceeds the capacity of the pipe line,
the pipe line company must apportion the amount to be shipped among the
various shippers, and it is prohibited from discriminating against any
shipper. 36 There is some evidence, however, which tends to show that pipe
lines are not observing their legal obligations.37 With the critical situation
now existing in transportation of gasoline this problem may become quite
significant.38
Exclusion of the independent refiner from use of pipe lines has tended
to limit competition in the petroleum industry. Because independent refiners
cannot use crude oil lines on a competitive basis, they have been forced to
locate largely in the fields. As a result, the major companies owning the pipe
lines, the chief effective outlets to the large markets, have been able to pur-
chase crude as monopolistic buyers at prices which are lower than they
33. See BEARD, op. cit. supra note 26, at 97.
34. See Petroleum Rail Shippers' Association v. Alton & Southern Railroad, 243
I. C. C. 589, 657 (1941).
35. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 136 (1940).
36. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), 49 U. S. C. § 3(1) (1940).
37. See TNEC Hearings at 8156 and 8172-8173.
38. Other service regulations restricting the use of pipe lines include the require-
ment of a very narrow range of specifications as to the quality of any shipment which
will be accepted. For example, the Sun Oil Company practically restricts shipments of
gasoline in its pipe lines to those qualities which are equivalent to "Blue Sunoco". This
has the effect of excluding lower grade gasoline produced by many independent refiners.
See CooK, op. cit. supra note 5, at 39.
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would be if independent refiners could operate on more nearly equal terms.
And the necessity for the independent refiners to locate in the fields and their
inability to use the gasoline lines on terms approaching equality with the
majors has put them at a disadvantage in competing in the big marketing areaq.
The result has been to give the majors virtually uncontested dominance in the
purchasing of crude oil and in the marketing of gasoline in the great consuming
areas. Since not all majors compete in any orne of the major consuming areas,
the number of firms effectively competing in each gasoline market is diminished
still further. As is usual in a market where there are only a few large firms
competing, the phenomenon of price leadership manifests itself. Each firm
realizes that if it were to cut price, each of its competitors would follow suit
and the result would be simply the division of the market on the same basis
as before but at a reduced level of prices.30 Consequently, instead of the
independent price policy characteristic of the more competitive market, the
various firms tend to follow tacitly the prices set by one of their number-
usually a larger firm known as the "price leader".
Evidence of price leadership in the gasoline market was furnished by
early investigations of the oil industry 40 and more recently in the Madison
Oil case.41 In this suit about twelve of the major oil companies, distributing
more than 85% of the gasoline sold in a ten-state mid-western area, were
convicted of rigging the gasoline market in violation of the Sherman Act.
Taking advantage of a trade practice which based the prices of the large
quantities of gasoline sold to jobbers42 on the price in the much smaller
"spot" 43 market, the defendant majors cooperated in a buying program in
39. It is possible that the elasticity of demand in the market might be such as to
result in a greater total money volume of business following the cutting of prices by the
few firms in the market. In this case the price reduction would take place. However, in
a price leadership market the equilibrium sale price finally reached would still be abave
the price set in the same market were it perfectly competitive.
Seemingly the demand for gasoline is relatively inelastic within a certain price
range. This apparently is true because the cost of gasoline is a relatively small item
needed to make effective the much larger investment represented by a car. See Hm!Im-
TON, PRICE AND PaIcE POLICIES (1938) 120.
40. See Br-RNS, THE DECLINE OF Co.narxITION (1936) 95 ct $eq.
41. Socony-Vacuum Oil Company v. United States, 310 U. S. 1U0 (1940). See Xote
(1940) 49 YAiE L. J. 761.
42. About 40% of the gasoline sold in the area was sold under long term contracts
with jobbers, who acted as intermediaries between the large refiners and the independent
service stations. Almost without exception these contracts provided that the sale price
was to be determined at the time the purchase was made by the quotations then current
in the "spot" market. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150 (1940),
Record on Appeal, pp. 999-1000, 3031-3042.
43. The "spot market" quotations represented the composite of prices on sales made
by oil field refineries, usually independents, in day to 'day transactions. These fales
amounted to less than 10% of the gasoline distributed in the area. During the Feriod h:-
fore the adoption of the majors' cooperative program, "spot market" prices had Limzn
depressed by the presence in the market of so-called surplus gasoline: that part of the
production of independent refiners for which they had no ready customers and which
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the "spot" market designed to buoy up that determining price and thereby
raise the price on the sales to jobbers. As wholesale prices to jobbers rose,
Standard of Indiana, the area market leader, likewise advanced tank wagon
prices 44 and retail prices at its service stations to maintain a customary fixed
margin over the "spot" market price .4  No price competition broke out to
interrupt the regulated advance. Had price leadership not existed, such a rise
in prices through this concerted program would probably have been impossible.
Although the overt cooperative buying program was eliminated by the decision
in the Madison Oil case, the basic competitive situation has not changed. Price
leadership is still characteristic of the refinery gasoline market and, hence, the
price for gasoline is higher than it would be in a more competitive market. 40
The independent jobber, because of the lack of independent refinery compe-
tition in the refinery gasoline market, has become largely dependent upon the
majors for his supply of gasoline.47 As a result, some independent jobbers,
while retaining a nominal status as independents, are forced to follow major
company policies as to wholesale price maintenance. 48 Others are going out
of the jobber business entirely,49 and are becoming agents or employees of
the majors.50 The result of this trend towards major domination of the jobber
market will be to decrease still further price competition in sales of gasoline
to the dealer.
In the retail field, perhaps the primary competitive consideration for the
integrated majors has been the maintenance of the volume of gasoline
sold - gallonage.5 1 Maintenance of gallonage even at a loss in marketing
operations meant that other departments of the integrated firm would be
kept operating. 52 In this effort to maintain position and to keep their names
they were obliged to sell for what it would bring in the spot market. This distress
position of the independent refiners resulted in part from the pegging under the NRA
code of the crude price at the very high level of one dollar. Id. at 952-953, 958-959. When
the price of gasoline failed to rise proportionately, the independent refiner who had to buy
his crude on the market was squeezed. In their program of cooperation the majors elimt-
inated the depressive effect of the low spot market price on the sale price under their
long term jobber contracts by jointly buying up the "surplus"gasoline. Note (1940) 49
YALE L. J. 761.
44. The tank wagon price is the price of sales made from the company truck to the
service station owner.
45. Id. at 251, 252, 290, 1233-1235.
46. See Hearings before a Stibcommittee of the Committec on the Judiciary on H.
R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 25, 125-126, 154; TNEC Hearings 7369, 7379.
47. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H.
R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 36, 119.
48. Id. at 138-139.
49. It has been estimated that from 1935 to 1939 the number of independent jobbers
decreased from 15,000 to 9,000. See id. at 379.
50. See TNEC Hearings at 8859.
51. HAMILTON, PRICE AND PucE POLICIES (1938) 124-140.
52. Difficulties in allocation of expenses and income for the processes of an integrated
firm make it hard to assess the profitability of pipe lines relative to other branches of
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before the public, the majors, as might be expected in a market organized
like the gasoline market, avoid price competition if possible. Instead each
attempts to increase its share of the market by building up irrational con-
sumer preferences for "Go-Gas", or for "No-Knox".5 The companies have
invested heavily in filling stations, which contributed in part to a wasteful
overbuilding of retail outlets,"4 and in branding and in advertising.,"
Owners of non-company owned filling stations are often forced to deal
exclusively in major company products50 partly because of the retailer's utter
dependence upon the majors for his supply of gasoline.r7 This practice, known
as full line forcing, is sometimes accompanied by major company control of
retail prices,58 although there is evidence that the majors are relinquishing
at least nominal control over policies of filling stations, both those not owned
by them and those owned by them and leased to an operator.59
Control of the pipe lines now appears to be the nerve center of the oil
empires, and the key to monopoly power in the industry. If the independent
refiner could be given real access to the pipe lines, many elements of the
majors' capacity to control prices throughout the petroleum industry would
be eliminated. Almost certainly, there would be an increase in independent-
owned refineries in the market areas.6° This increase might take some time,
especially in view of the war situation, but, ultimately, it would probably come
about.6' In addition, the present group of independent refiners located in the
the integrated companies. But there is some evidence indicating that "book" profits on
pipe lines have been high in relation to returns from other parts of the integrated opera-
tion, and that therefore control of the pipelines is a vital factor in making profitable inte-
gration possible. See id. at 130; Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Connittee on
the Judiciary on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 8.
53. Although the majors attempt to insulate demand for their product from the
effects of price competition, the nature of the retail gasoline market prevents their efforts
from being more than partially successful. For, due to the sensitivity of the market tu
small differences in retail prices, the independent retailer who is %%illing to cut prices
can force other dealers in his competitive area to follow his downward price movement.
See HAMILT-O, op. cit. supra note 35, at 117 et seq.
54. Id. at 129.
55. Id. at 125; Lesar, Public Control of the Oil Industry (Unpublished thesis in
the Yale Law School Library, 1937) 98.
56. See TNTEC Hearings at 8731-8735.
57. See TNEC Hearings at 8743, for evidence as to the influence of this factor ;n
full-line forcing.
58. See Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Coymnittee on the Judiciary o"
H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 149, 152.
59. HA MITON, PRICE AND PRICE POLICrES (1938) 139; Lesar, Pui Control of th~e
Oil Industry (Unpublished thesis in the Yale Law School Library, 1937) 123 et se,.
60. See TN\EC Hearings at 8161, 8545, 8546; H.AiLToN., PnIz A::D PRIC POLIWIC
(1938) 150-151.
61. It is, of course, possible that the small, independent refiner can no longer com-
pete with the major companies, due to the high costs of constructing a modern refinery.
But, for evidence to the contrary, see TNEC HearinIs at 8545.
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field would be able to compete with the market-located refineries, by sending
their gasoline to the major consuming areas via pipe line. Finally, the small
group of independent refiners located in the market area could, by using the
gasoline pipe lines, expand the area of their sales territory.
The consequent increase in competition from independent refiners should
benefit the producer, who would have several buyers for his crude, instead
of only one-the major owner of the pipeline outlet from his field- as
is usually the case now.0 2 More important, this increase in refinery com-
petition should produce a corresponding increase in competition in the
marketing of gasoline. The price of gasoline to the jobber should decrease,
as the independent refiner comes into the refinery market. The independent
jobber, being able to buy gasoline from the independent refiner, would no
longer be so completely dependent upon the major. Consequently, the jobber
would be better able to retain his independent status and his freedom of
action. Thus, prices to the dealer will tend to decline. At-the retail level,
increased competition from independent refiners should result in a decline
in full-line forcing, and a decrease in the retail price of gasoline. The position
of the independent service station dealer, who offers very effective price
competition to the majors,63 would be bettered, as his sources of supply
increase in number. Furthermore, real competition offered to the majors by
independents might well force increased use of cost reducing technology. All
of these changes would mean a substantial decrease in the price of gasoline
to the consumer, 4 in addition to helping thousands of independent business-
men retain a place in the petroleum industry. 5
LEGAL TECHNIQUES TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM
In an attempt to solve the pipe line problem, the United States brought
suit against 20 major oil companies and 59 pipe line companies, comprising
virtually all the important concerns. The suit was brought to enjoin further
violations of those provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act00 and the
62. See testimony of Alfred M. Landon in Hearings before Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 16695, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) 59.
63. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Consinittee on the Judiciary on H.
R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 222-223, 234, 311-312.
64. One estimate puts the decrease at 2c. per gallon. See TNEC Hearings at 7381.
65. The geographic extent of the effects of opening up the pipe lines is difficult to
predict. Probably, the greatest effect would be in the midwest, the south, and the Rocky
Mountain states. The effect on the Atlantic coast would not be great, since tankers, at
least until the war, have played so large a role there. Lack of evidence as to the present
accessibility of Pacific coast pipe lines to independent refiners makes prediction as to
that region impossible.
An additional benefit of bringing pipe line rates more nearly into line with pipe line
costs would be to make unitary operation of oil fields more effective. See Comment
(1942) 51 YALE, L. J. 608, 625.
66. 24 STAT. 379, 380, 381 (1887) (as amended), 49 U. S. C. § 6(7) (1940).
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Elkins Act17 which prohibit the granting or receiving of rebates from the
rates of interstate common carriers. The Government also sought to collect
triple the amount of rebates paid by the pipe lines to their oil company
owners, as is provided by the Elkins Act. It seems evident that the pipe
line companies and their oil company owners were violating the Acts. As
has been shown above, the pipe lines have been paying large dividends to
their owners. In effect, these dividends constituted rebates, since the oil
companies would pay the full rates to their pipe lines, but would get back,
in the form of dividends, a large part of the rates. In the light of the objective
of the Acts0 s of preventing commodities from being carried at less than the
published rates, the device of dividend payments appears to come within their
purview.
The result of the suit was a consent decree cO entered on December 23,
1941.70 Under the major provision of the decree, governing distribution of
earnings derived from common carrier services, no defendant common carrier
pipe line71 shall pay during any one year to any of its shipper-owners more
than 77% of the shipper-owner's share of the valuation of the common carrier's
property -if the carrier has transported any oil or gasoline for the shipper-
owner during that year. The valuation of the carrier's property is that deter-
mined by the Interstate Commerce Commission plus any additions or better-
ments and minus depreciation and retirements. If a pipe line company earns
more than 7% on its valuation, the excess is to be placed in a special surplus
fund. By the terms of the decree, this surplus may be used for three purposes:
(1) To maintain normal and reasonable working capital;
(2) To retire any debt outstanding at the time of the entry of the decree,
provided that such debt was originally incurred for the purpose of construc-
tion or acquisition of common carrier property; and
(3) To extend existing common carrier facilities or to construct or acquire
new common carrier facilities. However, surplus spent for constructing or
67. 32 STAT. 847 (1903) as amended by the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 587-559 (l19U ,
49 U. S. C. §41 (1940).
68. And as the Supreme Court has recently stated, results, not intentions determine
whether these Acts have been violated. Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 313
U. S. 450, 462 (1941). It could, however, be argued that since the Interstate Commerce
Commission, which has the primary duty of enforcing these Acts, acquiesced in this
practice of paying back rates in the form of dividends, the defendants did not knowingly
violate the Acts, and hence were not guilty of a punishable violation. For a fuller dis-
cussion of the legal aspects of the suit see (1942) 9 U. OF CHt. L. REr. 503.
69. This was euphemistically called a "final judgment" at the request of the de-
fendants. See Elkins Case Decree Will Limit Pipe-Line Profits (1941) 40 OIL .ND
GAS JouRNA. No. 33, p. 61.
70. United States v. Atlantic Refining Company, Civil Action 14060, (D. C. D. C.)
(1941) (unreported).
71. This applies to several pipe lines which are operated as departments of oil com-
panies, as well as to pipe lines which are operated as subsidiary companies of oil com-
panies.
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acquiring new facilities cannot be included within the valuation upon which
7% of the earnings may be paid out; therefore, no earnings whatsoever
can be paid out to shipper-owners on these new facilities.
Any defendant shipper-owner knowingly violating the terms of the decree
may be fined three times the amount of the sum received as a rebate.72
The theory of the decree is that the desire of the oil companies to maxi-
mize their profits will result in a decrease in pipe line rates, and hence,
permit independent refiners to make use of the lines. Although the excess
earnings can be used for working capital and to pay off debts, these two
outlets will be very small.78 In addition there probably will be little incentive
to use this excess for the construction of new facilities, since no earnings
whatsoever on new facilities can be paid out to shipper-owner oil companies.
Thus, the theory runs, rather than let this surplus lie idle, and in order to
avoid paying out for pipe line transportation excessive rates which cannot
be paid back as dividends, the oil companies will lower the rates of their
pipe line companies, thus lowering their own expenses for transportation. 14
It is hoped that the oil companies will elect to lower pipe line rates, in spite
of the fact that the result will be to enable independent and competing refiners
to use the lines.
However, it seems probable that the oil companies will elect to pay out
these excessive rates to their pipe line subsidiaries or departments, rather
than to invite more successful competition in all branches of the industry
by lowering pipe line rates. The reason for this choice would be that unre-
turnable payments to the pipe lines will probably amount to much less than
the loss in profits which would follow from an increase in competition from
independent refiners. For, in 1939, the median figure of pipe line dividends
as a percentage of net income for 13 major oil companies was 26%. 1 That
is, 26 cents of every dollar of net income was derived from pipe line opera-
72. The Government specifically reserved from this decree claims that it might have
against any of the defendants in the pending suit against the American Petroleum Insti-
tute and the major oil companies and their subsidiaries, United States v. American Pe-
troleum Institute, Civil Action 8524, (D. C. D. C.) (1940). This suit was brought
in order to eliminate monopolistic practices in all phases of the petroleum industry and has
been postponed pending conclusion of the war.
73. For figures indicating how small the debt of the pipe lines is, see Statistics of
Oil Pipe Line Companies Reporting to the Interstate Coninerce Commission for the
Year Ended December 31, 1941, 1. C. C. Bureau of Statistics, Statement No. 4133 (1941).
74. Some support for this theory may be found. For, when the federal income tax
law was changed to prohibit the filing of consolidated tax returns, which prevented the
large profits on pipe lines from being merged in the losses or profits from other depart-
ments of the integrated major, pipe line rates were lowered, so ps to decrease pipe line
profits and reduce taxes. See Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243
I. C. C. 115, 139 (1940) ; HAmILTOx, op. cit. supra note 48, at p. 152, n. 1.
75. See Prewitt, The Operation and Regulation of Crude Oil and Gasolie Pipe
Lines (1942) 56 Q. J. EcoN. 177, 179. In the entire petroleum industry oil and gasoline
pipe lines constitute but 7.6% of the total amount of invested capital. See TNEC Hear.
ings at 7701.
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tions. Before the entry of the decree the pipe lines were making and paying
out to their shipper-owners about 17% of their valuations.70  Under the
decree they can pay out 7% as dividends, or about 40% (7/17) of the rate
of return before the entry of the decree. 40% of 26% (the latter being the
ratio of pipe line dividends to net income for the shipper-owners prior to the
decree) is 10%. This means that while the present ratio of pipe line divi-
dends to net income for shipper-owners is 26%v, the consent decree will
reduce this figure to 10%. Thus, the decrease in oil company net income
amounts to only 16%. By reducing pipe line rates, the oil companies could
recoup this 16%. But, to reduce rates would be to permit small refiners
to use the lines. By attempting to maintain net income at its present figure,
competition will be increased, something which the major companies would
not desire. In fact, the attempt to prevent a 16c loss could result in a loss
of two or three times 16% as a result of competition in the market areas
from independent refiners. Furthermore, the oil companies can afford to let
the surplus lie idle in their pipe line companies for at least a few years. By
the terms of the decree, the stockholders of the oil companies will receive
this surplus if the pipe line company is ever dissolved. In the meantime,
the oil companies can afford to wait, perhaps in the hope of some new
development. Thus, from the standpoint of these considerations, the decree
is likely to be ineffective. 77 And, although nearly five months have elapsed
since the signing of the decree, there have been no widespread reductions in
pipe line rates.78
A prime defect of the decree is that the problem of service regulations,
especially that of minimum tenders, is not dealt with at all.7 Another sig-
nificant criticism of the decree is that the 7% return on value constitutes a
large sum with which to fight competition. Or, put in another way, the
sum amounts to a large rebate which oil companies will receive on their
shipping charges. From the standpoint of law enforcement, the decree may
well be said to countenance continued violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act and the Elkins Act, albeit only a 7% violation.
76. See supra at 1341.
77. It is reported that two attorneys in the Justice Department refused to sign the
decree, and that one resigned from the Department. See Stone, Handcuffing Thurnan
Arnold, (1942) 154 NATIo-i 387, 388. Congressman John 1. Coffee, of Washington, has
stated that the decree is inadequate, and has called for a Congressional investigation of
the circumstances surrounding the decree. Communication to the Y,%.E L.w Joum:AL,
May 20, 1942. See also 88 Cong. Rec., April 23, 1942, at 3791-3795.
78. Communication to the YALE LAW JoUrNAL, May 26, 1942, from the Pipe Line
Editor of the Oil and Gas Journal, which is a leading trade publication.
79. Minimum tender restrictions could have been attacked under the provisions of the
Elldns Act prohibiting discriminatory practices. A minor defect of the decree is its lim-
ited scope. Some pipe line companies are not covered by the decree, but more import-
antly, future pipe line companies are not included. Perhaps, a threat to prosecute under
the Eldns Act may be sufficient to induce entrance into the decree.
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There is also the possibility that the decree could be completely evaded
by the pipe lines, through a reversion to private carrier status. This would
have the additional advantage of freeing the lines from the regulatory powers
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Such a move is, however, beset
with difficulties, particularly in view of the attitude of the United States
Supreme Court, as reflected in the Valvoline Oil Company case.80 The
Court held in that case that an oil company owning and operating a pipe
line through which it transports to its own refineries, partly across state
lines, oil which it purchases from producers in the oil fields, is nevertheless
a common carrier within the meaning of the Interstate Commerce Act. Such
a company may constitutionally be required to furnish information to the
Interstate Commerce Commission for use in valuing the company's proper-
ties. The Court did not pass upon the question of whether the Commission
could regulate the rates and practices of such a company, but the tenor of
the opinion, and the record of the present Court, would indicate that reversion
to private carrier status would not be approved by the Supreme Court.8 1
Other legal techniques for opening up the pipe lines are available. Regu-
lation by the Interstate Commerce Commission could be more effective than
it is, if the Commission were to exercise the wide powers over pipe lines
given it by the Hepburn Act,82 and sustained by the United States Supreme
Court in the Pipe Line Cases.8 3 This power, in the words of the Commission
itself, extends to "the legality and lawfulness of each and all rates, charges,
rules, regulations, and practices" of interstate common carrier oil and gaso-
line pipe lines.8 4 From 1914, when the Pipe Line Cases were decided, down
to 1934, the Commission did very little in the way of regulating pipe line
rates and practices. In 1934, the Commission began an investigation into the
rates and practices of crude oil pipe lines, which has not yet been concluded.
In pursuance of this investigation, the Commission in December, 1940, issued
an order to a large group of the oil pipe line companies to show cause why
their rates should not be reduced so as to produce a net return of 8% on
value, and why their minimum tender requirements should not be reduced
to 10,000 barrels.88 Further hearings have been held since this show cause
80. Valvoline Oil Company v. United States, 308 U. S. 141 (1939). See also the
Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
81. A further possibility might be voluntary divorcement of the pipe line properties
from other interests of the major companies. For example, a major company might
transfer all the stock of its pipe line subsidiary to its own stockholders. These stock-
holders could control the pipe line company in the interests of their larger investments
in the oil company by maintaining rates at a high level, thus preventing independents
from using the lines. In addition, all the earnings of the pipe line, not just the 7%
allowed by the decree, could be paid out, since they would not go to any shipper-owner.
Such a scheme might face some difficulties, but it is a possibility to be considered.
82. 34 STAT. 584 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1940).
83. 234 U. S. 548 (1914).
84. Reduced Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 117 (1940).
85. Reduted Pipe Line Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115 (1940).
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order was issued, but after 8 years of investigation, the Commission has yet
to issue a final order.86 However, there have been some rate reductions made
since the show cause order was issued. 7
In the case of Petroleum Rail Shippers' Association -,. Alton & Southern
Railroad,s8 the Commission ordered substantial rate reductions and an ad-
justment of minimum tender restrictions for two gasoline pipe lines in the
mid-western area. The lines concerned were those of the Great Lakes Pipe
Line Company and the Phillips Petroleum Company, and these lines run
from the Mid-Continent oil producing area (Kansas, Oklahoma, and northern
Texas) to the large cities in the midwestern states. The extent of the reduc-
tions in rates can be gathered from the following table, which compares for-
mer rates with the newly ordered rates for the Great Lakes Pipe Line Com-
pany.8 9
Former rate New rate
From the midcontinent area to: in c. per i00 los. in c. per 100 lbs.
Kansas City, Mo.-Kan. ................... 23 10
Des Moines, Iowa ........................ 36 13
Omaha, Neb .............................. 36 15
Chicago, Ill ............................... 40 24
Minneapolis, 11inn. ....................... 46 21
The adjustment of minimum tender restrictions was of a less drastic
character.90 The order has proved of substantial benefit to the large group
of independent refiners located in the midcontinent producing area, who are
now better able to market their gasoline in the great marketing areas.01 The
decision takes on added significance since the largest group of independent
refiners is located in the midcontinent field.
Another technique which might be employed to open the pipe lines to in-
dependent refiners is the compulsory divorcement of pipe lines from the oil
companies which own them. Proponents of divorcement advance several
arguments for their plan. Thus, if the ownership of pipe lines is taken away
from major oil companies or major oil company stockholders, and placed in
86. It is possible that a lack of sufficient funds has been responsible for the delay
in issuing a final order.
87. Communication to the YALE LAW JOURNAL, 'May 26, 1942, from Pipe Line Editor
of the Oil and Gas Journal, one of the leading trade publications.
88. 243 I. C. C. 589 (1941).
89. See id. at 616 and 665.
90. See id. at 665. The Commission ordered that the pipe line companies accept for
transportation, subject to delay until the companies have accumulated at that receiving
point 25,000 barrels of the same specifications from the same or other shippers, ship-
ments as low as 5,000 barrels. But, the time during which such small shipments are
stored at origin shall be deducted from the storage time now allowed at destination.
Formerly, the companies would accept for shipment only tenders which were from one
shipper, and which amounted to at least 25,000 barrels.
91. Communication to the YAI.E LAW JOURNAL, May 2, 1942, from Traffic Manager
of the El Dorado Refining Company, El Dorado, Kansas.
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the hands of persons having no interests in the oil business, the pipe lines
should become more readily accessible to small shippers. Independent pipe
line companies, desiring only to maximize profits on the pipe line business,
would lower rates and eliminate repressive service regulations, with a view
towards getting the greatest possible amount of business away from the
tankers and the tanl cars. Rates and regulations would no longer be adjust-
ed with a view towards permitting the major company to buy crude oil at
favorable prices and preventing small shippers from using the lines; instead,
precisely the opposite viewpoint would prevail. Furthermore, it is contended
that divorcement would mean that the major oil companies would no longer
enjoy the large return on their investment in pipe line properties. Even 7%
or 8% of an investment of several hundred million dollars is a powerful
club in the competitive struggle 2 Terminating control over the pipe line
rates, which permits the majors to fix the prices at which they buy oil and sell
gasoline, should substantially reduce their power to buy cheap and sell dear.
Divorcement is probably the only step which might permit the achievement
of more competition in the petroleum industry, and of the economic and so-
cial objectives which animate the case for more competition.
On the other side of the ledger there are several objections to divorce-
ment. Conceivably, it might be difficult to market so vast a volume of securi-
ties. However, one suspects that the liberal attitude of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission towards profits, which was manifest even in the Petro-
leum Rail Shippers' Association case, 93 would induce buyers to invest money
in such a profitable venture. A similar point made is that unless the refiners
92. In 1935, the valuation of a very large percentage of oil pipe line mileage amount-
ed to over 450 million dollars, according to I. C. C. figures. See Reduced Pipe Line
Rates and Gathering Charges, 243 I. C. C. 115, 148 (1940). On the other hand, it should
not be forgotten that the oil companies could invest the proceeds from the sale of their
pipe line properties in other industries, such as synthetic rubber, plastics, or others,
Perhaps it would not be as easy to make 7 or 8% in these industries as in pipe lines,
but some profit could be made, and this profit could be used as a weapon in the struggle
for domination of the oil industry.
The National Recovery Act authorized the President to institute proceedings to
divorce pipe lines from holding companies whenever unfair practices or exorbitant rates
tended to create a monopoly. 48 STAT. 200 (1933), 15 U. S. C. § 709(b) (1934). Pro-
ponents of divorcement base its validity on the analogous separation of the railroads
from their coal interests by the Hepburn Act, 34 STAT. 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1(8)
(1940), and the divorcement of the meat packers from their retail outlets. Swift & Co.
v. United States, 276 U. S. 311, 328 (1928). See 6 TNEC, VERBATua RF.oRws OF PRO-
cEEDINGs (1939) 128, 255-59, 262; Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3, Judiciary Cons-
inittee, on H. R. 2318, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) 91-95; United States v. Columbia
Gas & Electric Corp., THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS (1938) 260 (consent decree divest-
ing companies of their control of natural gas pipe line).
93. For example, the cost of shipping 100 pounds of gasoline from Tulsa, Oklahoma,
to Chicago plus a profit of 10% on the value of carrier property amounts to 20c., while
the rate set by the Commission in this proceeding was 24c. Other rates set were coin-
parable to this in the matter of large profits being allowed. See Petroleum Rail Ship-
pers Association v. Alton and Southern R. R., 243 I. C. C. 589, 663, 665 (1941).
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own the pipe lines, new pipe lines to new fields will not be rapidly constructed,
thus harming the small producer. A mere transportation company, having no
assured refinery outlet, might hesitate to expend funds for new facilities.
This argument, however, overlooks the facts that refineries, whether they
own pipe lines or not, are interested in new sources of supply, and would
be willing to promise a certain amount of business to the pipe line company,
if the new line is built. If there is a real demand for transportation service,
that demand presumably would be met. As a corollary to the above, it is
said that the small producer would suffer from divorcement, since divorce-
ment would result in the abandonment of pipe line service to fields whicl
are nearly exhausted, or to fields which are no longer profitable to drill be-
cause of the discovery of better fields elsewhere. If the oil companies owned
the pipe lines, so the argument runs, pipe line service would be continued
in order to maintain a reserve of crude. However, if the production of a
field can no longer justify its use from an economic standpoint, that field
should not be subsidized by the maintenance of transportation service.
Opponents of divorcement argue that large savings result from integrated
operation. But operation of pipe lines as separate companies with their own
managements 4 and required to show separate profits probably will not in-
crease pipe line costs. For pipe lines today have manageiments, and divorce-
ment should not mean an increase in personnel. And as long as the
independent pipe line companies compete or are properly regulated by ad-
ministrative control, their charges should presumably be just sufficient to
cover costs and a fair return on investment - which were necessary costs
when the pipe line was part of an integrated firm. On the contrary, reduc-
tion of pipe line costs should result from horizontal rather than vertical com-
bination; and such horizontal integration could be gained by selling the
divorced lines to large pipe line corporations operating many thousands of
miles of pipe lines. Nor is it of any weight that integrated* operation gives
a business unit of larger size. 5 For there is no reason to believe that modern
corporate enterprises are of the optimum size from the standpoint of tech-
nology since they were created by financiers because of quite different con-
siderations. However, perhaps the close coordination possible under the
existing arrangement does result in lower production or refinery costs than
would be the case under divorcement. But against this possible advantage
must be placed the disadvantage of the monopolistic elements existing at
present in the industry. For now the integrated major, by maintaining a
high profit margin on its pipe lines, can force the non-integrated producer
to sell to him at what is usually a non-competitive price and can also place
the non-integrated refiner at a competitive disadvantage in marketing his
products in important consuming areas. 0
It is true that mere divorcement might not result in lowering rates and
elimingting burdensome service regulations. For pipe lines in some area-
94. See Beard, op. cit. supra note 26, at 122.
95. Stigler, The Extent and Bases of Monopoly (June, 1942) 32 Am. Eco:.. Rv. 1, S.
96. Id. at 22. See generally, BuRxs, DECLINE OF Co,-n'nrroN (1936) 431 c seq.
occupy a monopolistic position. For example, water transportation is un-
available in many areas, and railroad tank car rates are too high to offer the
pipe lines real competition. If there is only one pipe line in the area, or if two
or more pipe lines "cooperate," rates could be maintained at a level much
above costs. It is also conceivable that the superior bargaining position of
the major oil companies might influence the pipe line companies to discrim-
inate against small shippers in the matter of service regulations. In short,
divorcement is not utopia, and there would still be a need for regulation.
If divorcement is utilized as a method of solving the problem, several tech-
niques of achieving it are available. The government might ask for divorce-
ment in the pending anti-trust suit against the American Petroleum Institute
and the major oil companies. 97 Divorcement might also be secured by litiga-
tion based on those sections of the Interstate Commerce Act and the Elkins
Act which prohibit rebates.98 Congressional legislation would also be an
effective method of bringing about divorcement. The Commodities Clause
of the Hepburn Act99 could be applied to pipe lines.100 As presently worded,
the Commodities Clause, with minor exceptions, forbids railroads from car-
tying goods which they own or in which they have an interest. There is con-
siderable doubt as to whether the clause, as presently worded, would apply
to situations like that prevailing in the petroleum industry, where the manu-
facturer controls the carrier, instead of the opposite being the case.101 A mere
change of wording would, of course, make clear that no oil company could
ship petroleum or petroleum products over a pipe line which it owned in
whole, or in part.'0 2 If the Commodities Clause were applied to pipe lines,
the oil companies would be forced to sell their pipe line properties, or go
out of another branch of the industry. In order to prevent evasion of the
purpose of divorcement, administrative control of the divorcement process
should, perhaps, be provided.
There are additional solutions to the pipe line problem each of which can
be but briefly mentioned. Conceivably, a new government regulatory agency
could be set up to regulate the lines. Perhaps a new agency, charged directly
with regulating pipe lines, would be more aggressive in eliminating the pres-
97. United States v. American Petroleum Institute, Civil Action 8524, (D. C. D. C.)
(1940).
98. For an able treatment of divorcement by litigation see Black, Oil Pipe Line Di-
vorcement by Litigation and Legislation (1940) 25 CORN. L. Q. 510.
99. 34 STAT. 584, 585 (1906), 49 U. S. C. § 1(8) (1940).
100. While the Hepburn Bill was before the Senate for consideration, Senator Elkins
offered an amendment which would have applied the Commodities Clause to all common
carriers. However, as finally passed by Congress, the Commodities Clause was applied
only to railroads and excluded pipe lines. Since that time, there have been numerous
bills introduced in Congress to apply the Clause to pipe lines. See Black, supra note
98, at 533.
101. See id. at 532-533.
102. See id. at 533-536 for an excellent discussion of legislation which would effec-
tively apply the Commodities Clause to pipe lines.
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ent abuses in pipe line operations. Among the many objections to this pro-
posal, perhaps the chief one would be that it would result in a lack of co-
ordinated treatment of the whole of the transportation problem. There would
be another agency added to the number now engaged in regulating transpor-
tation. Such a plan would be especially open to this criticism now in view
of the critical situation in oil and gasoline transportation.
Possibly, government ownership and operation would be effective. Such
direct governmental participation should be on a limited scale, following
the TVA or yardstick principle, at least initially. For there would be
no need, for example, to take over all the crude lines running from the
mid-continent area to the Chicago area. If one were governmentally owned
and operated, it might be sufficient to handle all the oil that independent re-
finers might care to ship. In addition, such competition might.also result
in reduced rates for competing lines. Finally, it might well serve as a warn-
ing to pipe lines in other areas that abuses must end. An encouraging step
in governmental ownership is the gigantic new crude line now being built
from east Texas to Norris City, Illinois. Although this line, the world's
largest, is to be operated by the War Emergency Pipe Line, Inc., a cor-
poration formed by several majors, it is to be owned by the Defense
'Plants Corporation, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.
If, as proposed, this line is extended to the Eastern coast, governmental
ownership should again be provided. But, it should be remembered that gov-
ernment ownership alone may be of little value. A strict policy of control,
if not actual operation, is essential if the abuses in pipe line operation are not
to occur in the managing of this particular line.
The plan has also been proposed that pipe lines be treated not as common
carriers, but as plant facilities in an integrated industry. If pipe lines were
given this status, the whole of the oil industry might be given the status
of a public utility, and regulated as a single unit. It is contended that all
the economies of integration could be realized, while strict government control
of the entire industry would prevent abuses.' 03 Such a proposal raises
questions beyond the scope of this article, since it concerns the complex
problems of oil production, oil refining, and the marketing of petroleum
products. However, it is possible that the economies of integration have
received undue emphasis. In addition, competition should be given a further
chance to demonstrate its effects, before such a far-reaching proposal is
adopted. If the pipe lines could be made real common carriers, competitive
conditions might be restored in large measure, thus obviating the necessity
of the regulation of the entire industry.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this Comment has been to examine the pipe line problem,
and to indicate possible lines of advance, rather than to draw any final con-
103. See Ba-i.n, op. cit. supra note 26, for a discussion of this plan.
